



QUICK LOOK REPORT #8

TASK FORCE ENDURING LOOK



September 2002

The Air and Space Expeditionary Force



Our nation is at war with terrorism—there is no more “business as usual.” The AEF essentials of predictability, stability, rhythm, and capability will remain intact to the maximum extent practical, but we must do whatever it takes to continue meeting our war fighting and homeland defense commitments.

- USAF Chief of Staff General John P. Jumper

The United States Air Force made major contributions to the joint and combined combat operations in Afghanistan during Operation *Enduring Freedom*. While relying on the Air National Guard, the Air Force provided most of the air protection for the continental United States during Operation *Noble Eagle*. The Air Force relied successfully on the Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF) construct to provide air and space forces to *Enduring Freedom*. In the process, the AEF construct was tested to its limits—and worked.

Two simple measures of merit determined the success of the AEF construct in Operations *Noble Eagle* and *Enduring Freedom*: 1) Did we use the construct to quickly deploy the forces needed by the combatant commander? 2) Were most airmen deployed for only the AEF designed three-month period? The answer to the first question was yes. While the answer to the second question was no for the first wave of forces to support the crisis, the follow-on rotations did revert back to the AEF three-month standard for most personnel. According to the commander of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), the AEF construct quickly provided the forces he needed. As he put it in early 2002:

The Aerospace Expeditionary Force concept has proved valuable to United States Central Command because it has provided us with the ability to maintain airpower throughout the region. The Air

Force has used the AEF to continuously support Operation Southern Watch while maintaining the ability to react to additional contingencies such as Operation Enduring Freedom. I know that I can count on the men and women of the AEF for their support and professionalism, and because of this, I’ve had the air forces I need when and where I needed them. The AEF has proved its worth to me and Central Command.

- General Tommy R. Franks, USA,
Commander, USCENTCOM

By themselves, the organic resources of the two on-call AEFs were not sufficient to support resource requirements for Operation *Enduring Freedom* and still accommodate the desired three-month rotation of personnel. However, the Aerospace Expeditionary Force Center (AEFC) used its “reach forward” concept to meet manning requirements in several stressed career fields: security forces, supply, munitions, communications and computer systems, services, fuels, civil engineers, intelligence, and medical services. As a result, most airmen deployed for only the AEF designed three-month period. Balancing manpower to fill deployment tasking required some tour-length increases to 135 days or 179 days to stay within the AEF construct and still reduce the adverse impact to units and individuals. For AEFs 7 and 8, none of 15,257 steady state deployed airmen were extended; AEF 9 and 10 steady state airmen replaced them on schedule. Approximately 7,000 crisis-deployed airmen from AEFs 7 and 8 served


extended tour lengths (up to 179 days depending on when they were deployed). For AEFs 9 and 10, 1,077 of 25,600 deployed airmen (4.2 percent) were extended to 135-day or 179-day tours. The ANG participation in AEF 9/10 included 1,500 deployed personnel. An additional 320 Guard personnel filled active duty positions. The Air Force Chief of Staff directed a return to the three-month rotational concept of operations (CONOPS) to the greatest extent possible for AEFs 1 and 2, Cycle 3. For AEFs 1 and 2, only 648 airmen (about 3.1 percent) deployed beyond 90 days. The ANG participation in AEF 1/2 included 2,000 deployed personnel. An additional 180 Guard personnel filled active duty positions. For AEFs 3 and 4, the extended tour lengths in July 2002 were at 1,286 (6.7 percent) with nominations for AEFs 5 and 6 almost 80 percent complete. Extended tour lengths have increased significantly from AEFs 1 and 2 due to Air Reserve Component (ARC) demobilization and will continue to increase as the AEFC completes sourcing for the AEFs 5 and 6 rotation. At July 2002 levels of contingency tasking, the AEF construct was meeting both combatant commander force requirements and the three-month deployment guideline for most airmen.

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE AEF CONSTRUCT

The AEF construct originated in the Headquarters U.S. Air Force (HAF) Directorate of Plans (XOX) in 1989. The Deputy Director for Warfighting Concepts proposed that the Air Force be reorganized into ten composite wings. These wings would comprise a highly capable mix of combat aircraft, planners, and combat support

forces operating under a single warfighting leader. Each composite wing would have the organic capability to plan, train, deploy, and conduct combat operations as a nearly independent force package (much like an aerospace version of a Roman legion). One or two wings might handle small contingencies. Larger contingencies might require all of the wings. In 1991, the 366th Composite Wing was established at Mountain Home AFB. The Air Force Chief of Staff labeled it an “air intervention” wing, and claimed it was likely to make “smaller mistakes, because it works and trains together in peacetime...it knows the playbook...in other words, it can exploit the inherent flexibility of airpower.” Air Force leaders experimented further by creating a second composite wing with forces not collocated. These actions predated the creation of today’s AEFs, which comprise roughly equal “buckets” of capability.

During the 1990s, the large number of contingency and crisis operations stretched and stressed Air Force capabilities. By 1998, with one third fewer people, 40 percent fewer fighter squadrons, and 66 percent fewer permanent overseas bases, the Air Force was deploying its forces 4 times more frequently than it was at the beginning of the decade in response to international requirements. This increased operational tempo (OPTEMPO) hurt readiness, recruiting, retention, and modernization. The Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Air Force directed the creation of 10 AEFs in 1998 to improve deployment predictability and force stability. In addition to those improvements, their objectives were to: 1) meet the combatant commanders’ requirements by providing tailored, responsive forces able to



accomplish the desired strategic, operational, and tactical effects, and 2) control OPTEMPO and personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO). The AEFs would be scheduled in pairs for 3-month windows of deployment availability within each 15-month AEF planning cycle.

Even before the 11 September 2001 attacks, which occurred just over half way through AEF Cycle 2, Air Force leaders had identified and were working on solutions to two key problems: 1) inadequate AEF resources; and 2) inadequate education and outreach regarding the AEF construct. Resource shortages, which are addressed in other parts of this paper, included the deficits in Low Density/High Demand (LD/HD) assets, expeditionary combat support, as well as active duty and Air Reserve Component forces. To address deficiencies in AEF education and outreach, the Air Staff's concepts, doctrine, and strategy office, or "Skunk Works" (AF/XOXS) and the AEFC agreed to an outreach program to penetrate planning and education processes Air Force-wide and within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and the combatant commanders' staffs. The AEFC would focus its efforts at the wing level and below in the Air Force. AF/XOX would concentrate above the wing level in the Air Force and throughout OSD and the Joint community. The AEFC was just beginning its outreach programs when it was interrupted on 11 September 2001. Nonetheless, the AEF construct paid dividends almost immediately in supporting Operations *Noble Eagle* and *Enduring Freedom*.

SUCCESSES: THE AEF CONSTRUCT IN ACTION

The speed with which the Taliban were rendered ineffective as a fighting force is particularly noteworthy, considering that a "prepackaged" contingency plan for military action in Afghanistan didn't exist.

- John G. Roos, Armed Forces Journal International, February 2002

Much was accomplished in the short 26day period between the 11 September 2001 attacks and the beginning of combat operations in Afghanistan on 7 October 2001. The AEF

construct facilitated America's rapid, effective response.

Readily deployable unit type codes (UTC) made it easier to source, deploy, and tailor forces to meet theater requirements levied by the commander of United States Central Command (USCINCCENT). Many Air Force organizations, to include the AEFC, made the UTC an efficient force management tool. Furthermore, AEFC involvement in the AEF manpower nomination, scheduling, and coordination process was crucial to successful deployment planning for Operations *Enduring Freedom* and *Noble Eagle*.

Operation *Noble Eagle* was a successful joint and coalition operation, with the Air Force's Total Force making major contributions in the continental United States. The commander of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is responsible for organizing, equipping, and operating air defense forces for the aerospace warning and control of the sovereign airspace of Canada and the United States. NORAD is responsible for three geographic regions: the Continental United States Region (CONR), the Canadian Region, and the Alaskan Region. The commander of Air Combat Command's First Air Force, which relies considerably on the Air National Guard, also serves as Commander CONR. He was appointed the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) for Operation *Noble Eagle*.

The Air Reserve Component forces provided extensive support to *Noble Eagle*. Nineteen ANG and two AFRC fighter wings flew F16s and F15s on combat air patrols or sat strip alert, complementing the six active duty fighter wings. ARC aircrews employed KC10s and KC135s for air refueling; C5s and C17s for airlift of support personnel and supplies; U.S. and NATO AWACS aircraft for airspace control; air control squadrons for low altitude radar coverage and communications support to the FAA; and, C9s for aeromedical evacuation and transport of their medical teams. Since the initial attacks, more than 450 ground alerts have scrambled, which is more than 7 times the normal experience. On any given day through March 2002, about 14,000 active duty and ARC airmen were engaged in Operation *Noble Eagle*, operating from approximately 30 sites throughout

the United States. Although *Noble Eagle* requirements have been reduced by about one third from their highest level, the current level of effort is about three times what it was before the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack.

Operation *Enduring Freedom* (Afghanistan) was also a successful joint/ coalition operation, with the Air Force providing major contributions to the overall effort through the AEF construct. USCINCCENT was the supported combatant commander, with the supported component commander changing for each combat phase (for example, the Combined Joint Force Air Component Commander led an early phase of combat operations; and the Combined Joint Force Land Component Commander led a later phase).

The scope of USAF-supported operations can be seen in the following: from 7 October 2001 to 1 April 2002, the USAF flew more than 24,000 sorties (over 50 percent of all Operation *Enduring Freedom* missions). USAF bombers, fighters, airlift, tankers, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets were in action every day. USAF B2s, B1s, B52s, A10s, F15Es, F16s, and AC130Us dropped more than 9,000 tons of munitions (about 79 percent of the OEF total) and damaged or destroyed nearly 75 percent of planned targets.

The Air Force provided full spectrum air and space Total Force support. Tankers flew more than 8,500 refueling missions supporting aircraft from all services. ISR assets, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), Rivet Joint, U2, and AWACS, and electronic warfare assets, such as Compass Call and the ANG's Commando Solo, flew more than 1,300 missions to provide battlespace awareness. JSTARS flew more than 200 missions supporting combat operations. C17s delivered more than 2.5 million humanitarian daily rations to the people of Afghanistan.

Operation *Enduring Freedom* marked the first time in history that the Air Force deployed a major combat capability to a conflict and then replaced that entire force during combat. As AEF Cycle 3 began on 1 March 2002, 25,600 Air Force people were required in the theater. By the end of July 2002, the entire *Enduring Freedom* force had rotated in accordance with the AEF construct. It is

important to note that the level of combat capability did not change—the Air Force maintained a relatively constant level of combat capability to meet the combatant commander's requirements. However, some of the equipment and all of the AEF people rotated.

Even while conducting Operation *Enduring Freedom*, nearly all operational exercises were executed and filled with personnel from the AEF training window. For example, during FY00, 01, and 02, combatant commanders cancelled only four exercises (*Tempo Brave*, one phase of *Unified Endeavor*, and two classified USCENTCOM exercises)—that amounted to only four percent of all exercises. As of June 2002, there had been no serious discussion of canceling any further operational exercises in the near future.

SHORTCOMINGS: OPERATIONS NOBLE EAGLE AND ENDURING FREEDOM STRESSED THE AEF SYSTEM

While the Air Force successfully supported the early achievement of USCINCCENT's theater objectives, continuous combat operations stressed the AEF construct. In fact, there was significant stress on the force as a whole, particularly affecting expeditionary combat support, airlift, tankers, AWACS, and ISR.

However, Air Force airmen did exactly what was expected of them: they overcame all obstacles to accomplish the mission. Specifically, they overcame challenges like reduced en route infrastructure, austere bases, diplomatic clearance problems, limited fuel, and limits on maximum aircraft on the ground and hot cargo pads.

Much of the U.S. Air Forces Central Command (USCENTAF) staff deployed to the theater during time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) planning and execution. Early confusion over USCENTAF and AEFC roles and responsibilities affected the Air Combat Command crisis action team (CAT). Without an operations plan (OPLAN) or a well developed, tested, and exercised TPFDD, planners had to build them as forces were flowing. These deployments further complicated the process of providing command and

control while simultaneously flowing the right forces, equipment, and supplies to the appropriate locations.

Problems with the deployment order (DEPOD) system delayed the process of getting the right people and units to the right place. One complication was the sheer volume of deployment orders—over 130 DEPODs had been issued by 20 March 2002, more than in all of Operation *Desert Storm*. Long before the initiation of combat operations during *Desert Storm* a relatively short period of crisis response preceded the welcome transition to deliberate planning. In Operation *Enduring Freedom*, a period of crisis preceded rapid initiation of combat operations followed by a surge of contingency deployments.

Piecemeal deployments during the crisis without using an OPLAN or a TPFDD resulted in misalignment of forces—wrong people and units at the wrong place and time. Such deployments also make in-transit visibility (ITV) extremely difficult, complicating the challenges of commanders and staffs at all levels. In coordination with combatant commanders, the Air Force is working to ensure all planning staffs are appropriately involved in deployment and combat employment planning.

The Air Force depended on ARC forces to fill additional requirements as well as to provide expertise and capabilities only available in the ARC. These forces were absolutely vital to the success of Operations *Noble Eagle* and *Enduring Freedom*. However, problems emerged with mobilization of ARC forces using a Cold War-based process and laws not aligned with the current AEF process. The large numbers mobilized, and the length of their mobilization, made future ARC availability difficult to predict. ARC participation through volunteerism and mobilization increased from filling 11 percent of expeditionary combat support and 24 percent of aviation requirements to filling 38 percent of all AEF requirements. A continuing cycle of mobilization and demobilization of ARC forces to meet the AEF schedule may impact the ARC member's civilian profession. As a result, the long-term ARC sustainability in the current AEF construct could be adversely affected.

The AEFC and MAJCOMs sometimes bypassed ARC forces, because they believed they

could not be mobilized quickly enough. One challenge was the ARC crisis action team policies of requesting volunteers prior to mobilization. Problems were encountered when individuals and small groups, rather than entire UTCs filled requirements. This was a complication for personnel accountability and UTC identification. It also resulted in the unplanned arrival of many ARC personnel in the theater. The Air Force also deployed some ARC airmen whose AEF deployment vulnerability period had not yet arrived, thus eliminating their future availability.

Another problem was the assignment of individual augmentees to meet demands for particular skills—especially to augment higher headquarters staffs. Handling individual assignments was a labor-intensive process, one not synchronized with TPFDD or UTC movements. These challenges complicated deployment, tracking, and redeployment. The AEFC took on management of these individual requirements to ensure individual augmentee requirements were deconflicted with UTC sourcing and to ensure supporting actions (such as transportation, personnel accountability, and deployment orders) were completed. In the process, the AEFC began developing systemic improvements in effectiveness, efficiency, management, and visibility. The AEFC was adapting processes and procedures to integrate these individual augmentee requirements into the AEF management and tracking systems. Individual requirements are necessary as new requirements arise in any combat operation. But the home base loses that capability for a period of time, resulting in shortfalls, mission degradation, and stress on families and units.

Some LD/HD assets, both aircraft weapons systems and personnel, have operated in what amounts to a surge mode. They face long-term shortfalls in personnel, force structure, and funding. Despite NATO augmentation, for example, U.S. E3 AWACS aircraft have been operating above Global Military Force Policy surge levels since 11 September 2001. RC135s, U2s, and HC130s also are operating above surge levels.

All LD/HD assets possess limited training capacity, and Operations *Enduring Freedom* and *Noble Eagle* reduced this even further. For example: RC135 Rivet Joint aircraft had to use

training assets to meet operational mission requirements, and combat search and rescue (CSAR) training unit production was not adequate to meet expanded operational requirements. Nearly all LD/HD platforms had to use training-unit instructors and/or training aircraft to accomplish their missions. Many platforms relied highly on mobilization to cover requirement shortfalls. Notably, LD/HD assets were not the only ones affected by these operations. The fighter units pulling constant combat air patrol missions for Operation *Noble Eagle* also were impacted.

Deployment training programs are not yet optimized for the expeditionary mission. Currently, the Air Force does “just-in-time” training in many ECS functional areas. The two-month period of pre-deployment training during the 15-month AEF cycle might not be dedicated to preparation for the theater, because home station duty requirements still must be accomplished and often take priority. In most cases, short-notice crisis requirements preclude an ECS training spin up opportunity prior to deployment.

The ARC forces were significantly tasked, posing challenges to support the AEF construct. As of July 2002, the Air Force had mobilized a total of 31,648 ARC people (18,475 Air National Guard and 13,173 Air Force Reserve) under partial mobilization authority. The partial mobilization directed by the president can keep selected ARC forces on active duty for up to 24 months. ARC airmen performed missions in almost every career field, including command and control, security, intelligence, flight operations, communications, air refueling operations, aero-medical, maintenance, civil engineering, and logistics. In addition, 5,663 ARC airmen (4,378 Air National Guard and 1,285 Air Force Reserve) volunteered to participate in *Noble Eagle* and *Enduring Freedom*. As of July 2002, 8,367 Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve airmen deployed from their home installations to CONUS and overseas locations; about 5,100 of those were in the USCENTCOM area of operations. Employment of the ARC was a major success story for the integration of active duty and ARC forces. However, extensive use of mobilized ARC personnel on a sustained basis raises important questions for both ongoing and future AEF operations. What happens to the AEF

system if contingency operations continue against worldwide terrorist threats? What happens to ARC units activated for one year? What will be the long-term impact on recruiting and retention?

We opened 13 unplanned FOLs for Operation *Enduring Freedom*. None has yet closed. Each requires commanders, staffs, operations, logistics, security, and varying degrees of base operations and support. The same forces must support home station requirements and expeditionary operations. Trying to do both simultaneously means that often one mission or the other will suffer, or that commanders must provide additional forces to meet shortfalls.

KEY AEF ISSUES

By highlighting stress points in the AEF construct, Operations *Noble Eagle* and *Enduring Freedom* have created an opportunity for the Air Force to optimize the AEF construct for war and to further institutionalize the AEF concept within the Department of Defense. At the 10 June 2002 4-star Corona meeting, Air Force leaders addressed the AEF construct. They decided to: 1) retain ten AEFs; 2) maintain three-month rotations as much as possible, except for stressed career fields; 3) deploy some people in stressed career fields as long as 179 days; 4) align the two air expeditionary wings into the existing ten AEFs for tasking in Cycle 4, beginning 1 June 2003; and 5) fix the stressed career fields as soon as possible so that the three-month policy becomes a reality for all. These decisions continued the positive momentum of AEF construct implementation.

The following issues should be considered for action to sustain this implementation momentum:

- AEFs:
 - Defining the size and capability of the basic AEF ECS element (it's no longer the squadron).
 - Ensuring the certification process verifies that units and individuals arrive at FOLs with the required training and equipment.
- Planning:
 - Normalizing crisis planning (rather than continuing to emphasize peacetime, steady state planning).
 - Developing policies for the transition from peace to wartime operations (defining how

we will use AEFs, and especially expeditionary combat support, to fill TPFDDs for both deliberate and crisis action planning).

- Determining how “reach forward” impacts force reconstitution.
- Working with the Joint Staff to ensure Joint planning tools (such as the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System) reflect AEF capabilities and match 21st century threats.
- Training:
 - Ensuring we train as we plan to fight (starting with optimizing units for expeditionary operations rather than peacetime efficiency).
 - Determining how “reach forward” impacts our ability to meet recurring training demands.
- Doctrine:
 - Updating all relevant Air Force doctrine to better incorporate the AEF construct.
- Guidance:
 - Updating guidance documents (such as AFI 10400) to reflect lessons learned from Operations *Noble Eagle* and *Enduring Freedom*.
 - Infusing AEF construct into CJCS guidance to decrease planning, force presentation, employment, and C2 challenges.
- Leadership:
 - Ensuring AEF leaders receive adequate AEF construct education and training prior to crisis deployment.
 - Ensuring AEF command and control planning accounts for the transition from steady state to crisis (leadership elements at all levels must be organized, trained, and equipped to be expeditionary).
 - Pre-planning for appropriate staffing and location of the Air Force Forces (AFFOR)-rear (such as the possible collocation of USCENTAF Rear with Air Combat Command at Langley AFB).
- Personnel:
 - Deconflicting permanent change of station (PCS) rotations with AEF on-call periods when necessary.
- Resources:
 - Working with the Joint Staff to develop a validation process to establish priorities to meet combatant commander requirements (this includes peacetime staffing, training exercises, and combat contingency forces—right now it’s largely first come, first served).

- Reviewing LD/HD resourcing and stressed career field manning (both of which place limits on AEF force presentation).
- Force Presentation:
 - Resolving the significant disconnect between the AEF construct’s ability to present AEF capabilities to fulfill combatant commander requirements, and the inclination of the combatant commanders to request specific units or types of weapon system to define their requirements.
- Air Reserve Component:
 - Updating policy to define how ARC airmen can consistently be mobilized, deployed, employed, and demobilized in accordance with the AEF construct.
- The AEF Center:
 - Providing AEFC the authority to task MAJCOM certified, on-call UTCs. Notwithstanding AFSOC’s requirement to retain its own tasking authority to meet USSOCOM tasking, this could improve AEFC’s capability to rapidly meet other combatant commander requirements.
 - Accounting for the impacts on existing OPLANs of AEF deployment of air mobility and en route support base assets, and other limited capabilities, which are insufficient in number to meet competing priorities.
 - Accounting for the further impacts on existing OPLANs of using air mobility resources to sustain the three-month rotation policy.
 - Refining the AEF construct compatibility with other Air Force and joint planning and deployment systems.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Chief of Staff should continue to lead the ongoing AEF transformation of the Air Force by doing the following:

- Infuse an expeditionary mindset.
- Organize, train, equip, educate, and plan for an expeditionary role.
- Present tailored, capable, ready forces to combatant commanders for expeditionary missions.
- Encourage the joint world to further integrate expeditionary air and space power.
- The senior Air Force leadership (4-star level) should continue to oversee their functions in the ongoing AEF transformation. This calls for special attention to ensure functional area

managers are immediately engaged in the process.

- The vice chief of staff and the vice commanders of the nine major commands should continue to guide AEF transformation and institutionalization. This calls for ensuring that working level steering groups (such as the MAJCOM colonel-level steering groups, combat air forces senior integrated process team, and expeditionary combat support integrated process team) are working the details of key issues and keeping the vice commanders well-apprised.
- The AF/XO, in conjunction with AF/DP, AF/RE, and ANG, should initiate a review of the ARC mobilization/demobilization processes to gather lessons learned for future consideration and implementation.
- The Office of the Special Assistant for AEF Matters (AF/CC-AEF) should:
- Develop a road map for AEF institutionalization.
- Implement the AEF road map.

- Spread the word throughout the Department of Defense on what the AEF construct brings to the joint battle.
- Track and coordinate efforts to address the key AEF issues identified above, as well as other emerging issues.
- Coordinate and monitor AEF studies, analyses, and development efforts across the Air Force.

SUMMARY

Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the Air Force responded immediately using its air and space expeditionary force. Clearly, providing ECS support for 13 forward operating locations in *Enduring Freedom*, while simultaneously supporting a greatly expanded homeland defense mission in *Noble Eagle*, and continuing support for steady-state rotational deployments stressed the AEF construct. Yet, Air Force analysts agree that while limited resources remain the principal problem in certain career fields and within LD/HD assets, the AEF construct is sound.

ENDURING LOOK PUBLICATIONS:

- (U) Quick Look #1. *Quick Look Reports: A Primer* (U), March 2002.
- (U) Quick Look #2 (S). *Combat Support and Expeditionary Basing*. March 2002. (Secret)
- (U) Quick Look #3. *Eyes on the Ground* (U), June 2002. (Secret)
- (U) Quick Look #4. *Air Mobility's Global Reach* (U), June 2002. (Secret//NOFORN)
- (U) Quick Look #5. *Coercive Airpower from the Enemy's Perspective: The Collapse of the Taliban* (U), July 2002. (Secret//NOFORN)
- (U) Quick Look #6. *Mobilization* (U), September 2002. (Secret)
- (U) Quick Look #7. *Senior Space Leadership and Command and Control* (U), September 2002. (Secret)
- (U) Quick Look #8. *The Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF)* (U), September 2002.

TASK FORCE *Enduring Look*

Established in October 2001, Task Force *Enduring Look* (TFEL) captures lessons learned during Operations *Enduring Freedom* and *Noble Eagle*. Additionally, TFEL is responsible for Air Force-wide data collection, exploitation, documentation and reporting on our air campaign against terrorism and efforts to provide humanitarian relief.

Enduring Look publications include Fact Sheets, Occasional Papers, and Interim Reports. A Quick Look represents first round analysis of a topical or functional issue that is deemed relevant for immediate distribution to Air Force units engaged in the war.

Col Fred Wieners, Director

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CIV (703) 696-0791
DSN 312 426-0791

Email:
enduring.look.reporting@pentagon.af.mil
enduring.look.reporting@af.pentagon.smil.mil

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